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p e t e r b r i c k e y l e q u i r e
a n d d a n i e l s i l v e r
Critical Naı¨vete?
Religion, Science and Action
in the Parsons-Voegelin Correspondence
Abstract
Between 1940 and 1944, sociologist Talcott Parsons and political scientist Eric
Voegelin engaged in a vigorous correspondence, discussing the origins of totalitarianism
and modern anti-Semitism, the legacy of Max Weber, patterns of secularization set in
motion by the Protestant Reformation, the methodology and goals of social science, and
more. This article introduces and explicates the surprisingly amicable and intellectually
rich exchange between these two seemingly different thinkers. Although the letters hold
obvious historical interest, their variegated topics are also closely thematically related,
revealing an inner logic that we interpret as a theoretical search for “critical naı¨vete”.
This logic, we argue, is relevant to contemporary discussions about the social, political,
and scientific legacies of world-transcendent spiritual traditions.
Keywords: Parsons; Voegelin; Religion; Theory of action; Anti-Semitism; Transcendence;
Axial age.
T A L C O T T P A R S O N S (1902-1979) needs no introduction; he is
well-known within sociology for his foundational contributions to that
field, and familiar to English-speaking scholars in many disciplines
through his influential translations of Max Weber’s writings. Eric
Voegelin (1901-1985), by contrast, has long been highly praised by
a few political theorists and philosophers, but generally neglected by
mainstream social scientists. Voegelin was born in Germany but
educated in Austria. During the 1930s, his publications on legal
theory and intellectual history were bitingly critical of Nazi ideology.
Following the Anschluss in 1938 he narrowly evaded the Gestapo and
fled with his wife to the United States; they were naturalized as
American citizens in 1944. Voegelin taught briefly at Harvard
University, Bennington College, and the University of Alabama
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before finding a permanent position at Louisiana State University in
1942. There he began a grandly ambitious philosophy of history that
earned him brief fame in the mid-1950s, and (to his chagrin) a number
of lasting admirers among conservative American intellectuals. In
1958 he was offered a post at the Ludwig Maximilian University of
Munich – the chair in political science that had been empty since the
death of its previous occupant, Max Weber, in 1920 – and so returned
to Germany. There he founded an Institute for Political Science and
contributed to public debates about Germany’s Nazi past and democratic
future, but kept his American citizenship. Over time, he became
increasingly occupied with his own meditative, philosophical study of
human consciousness. In 1969 Voegelin retired to the Hoover Institution
of Stanford University, and continued to write until his death.
Although not a sectarian thinker, Voegelin held that a society’s
political order depended on its spiritual health, and that political
theory must therefore include the evaluation of religious beliefs and
theological ideas. Only in recent years, as the continuing significance
of religion in modern public life has become increasingly apparent,
have his writings begun to attract a wider readership. Yet in his own
day Voegelin’s interest in the interplay of religion and politics was
shared by Parsons, so much so that between 1940 and 1944 the two
men engaged in a vigorous correspondence – twenty-five extant letters
that touch on the origins of totalitarianism and modern anti-Semitism,
the legacy of Max Weber, the patterns of secularization set in motion
by the Protestant Reformation, and more. The letters – a revealing
intellectual exchange now published on the European Journal of
Sociology website in its entirety – served to extend and refine ideas that
Parsons and Voegelin developed in face-to-face conversations, ideas
which hold broad relevance for contemporary sociology and political
theory, and for the study of religion’s role in public life.1 With the pub-
lication of the complete correspondence, a broader intellectual commu-
nity is now in a position to assess this rich dialogue. The letters hold
obvious appeal for historians of ideas, of the social sciences, and of the
academy in twentieth-century Europe and America. Yet the significance
of the exchange is not just historical, for its seemingly variegated topics
are, in fact, closely thematically related and reveal an inner logic.
This essay articulates that logic in five sections. First, we situate the
correspondence in relation to the projects Parsons and Voegelin were
1 Most letters by Voegelin, but none by
Parsons, are printed in Voegelin 1989-2009,
vol. 29, and all are in Bortolini 2000 (in Italian
translation). The Parsons-Voegelin letters re-
ferred to in this article are available online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003975613000192.
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engaged in at the time, namely Parsons’ theory of social action and insti-
tutional integration and Voegelin’s philosophical history of political ideas.
Both endeavors were motivated by a distinctive concern for secularization,
and in a similarly unusual sense. Secularization for Parsons and Voegelin
does not imply the disappearance of world-transcendent symbols from
social life but modern society’s appropriation (for good or for ill) of ideas
of transcendence. This shared attitude toward the enduring relevance of
transcendent imagery in modern society is one of the intellectual affinities
that brought the two men together into correspondence.
Second, we highlight those letters in which Parsons and Voegelin
discuss two patterns of secularization, one they associate more with
Lutheranism, the other with Calvinism. They connect these patterns to
disparate tendencies toward anti-Semitism, haltingly working through
ideas they would publish later in more polished form.
Third, we turn to Parsons’ controversy with the Austrian emigre
Alfred Sch€utz, the eminent philosopher who provided much of the
inspiration for phenomenological sociology.2 In May 1941, Parsons
asked Voegelin to mediate in what had become an unpleasant con-
troversy with Sch€utz. Although Sch€utz and Voegelin were longtime
friends with similar academic training, in this matter Voegelin’s intel-
lectual sympathies were with Parsons. The correspondence suggests
that by 1940 Parsons and Voegelin had come independently to
agreement on the important methodological issues that separated
Parsons and Sch€utz.
The discussion turns on the proper methodology for a social science
that aims to do justice to the subjective element of human action.
Voegelin clarifies the sources of the dispute by tracing it back to the
very different intellectual cultures within which Parsons and Sch€utz
developed their ideas – Sch€utz in the more speculative Austrian milieu,
Parsons in the more empirical-scientific American one. This account of
the controversy provokes a self-reflective turn in the correspondence,
where both men begin to articulate the role of transcendence in their
own approaches to social science.
The fourth section takes up the topic that most divides Parsons and
Voegelin: the interpretation of Max Weber. Parsons sees in Weber a
first step toward a systematic social science; Voegelin sees in Weber an
example of the irreducibly fragmentary character of the creative in-
tellect. This seemingly small interpretative disagreement foreshadows
the divergent trajectories Parsons and Voegelin will take. Each in his
2 Grathoff 1978 contains the Parsons-
Sch€utz correspondence, and Rehorick and
Buxton (1988) discuss Voegelin’s role in the
exchange.
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own way goes in search of what we call “critical naivete,” a capacity for
reflective distance that does not lose empirical or practical touch with
that which one has transcended. Parsons becomes more critical in as-
sessing the religious conditions of his own previously “naı¨ve” stance,
even as Voegelin becomes more “naı¨ve” in embracing the truths he finds
in ancient traditions.
Finally, we connect the correspondence as a whole to ongoing dis-
cussions of transcendence and social science, especially “the axial age
debate”. In the form given to it by Karl Jaspers (1949), that debate is
grounded in the humanistic sense that transcendent religion can foster
a politically salutary kind of subjective belief (Jaspers 1953: 164; see
also Armstrong 2006). The universalism implicit in multiple religious
traditions, not to mention Greek rationalism, points toward the shared
human capacity to transcend local circumstances and find a common
humanity (see Boy and Torpey 2013). The Parsons-Voegelin correspon-
dence, however, indicates another inspiration for discussions of the great
axial traditions. In religious history, the breakthrough to transcendence is
produced by, and in turn produces, a critical stance toward received dogma,
traditional social norms, and local practices. In recent history, the Axial Age
debate itself has become a medium for public reflection on the conditions
of the possibility of this critical stance. Neither affirming nor denying its
empirical validity, we observe that the Axial Age debate functions as a
“metadiscourse” in which scholars of diverse political, scientific, and
religious (or non-religious) backgrounds communicate across methodolog-
ical lines (see, e.g., Black 2008, Dalferth 2012, and Green 1992). Parsons’
and Voegelin’s epistolary discussion of the scientific and political
legacies of transcendence, we argue, presages this debate, to which
both thinkers would subsequently and substantially contribute.
Although their friendship was short-lived, their remarkable mutual
intelligibility was no coincidence; it bespoke a spiritual kinship
grounded in the shared conviction that social-scientific methodology
must be adapted to reflect social reality, with the aim of fostering
meaningful social action.
Theory of social action – History of political ideas
Parsons and Voegelin struck up their friendship during the autumn
of 1938 at Harvard University, where Voegelin held a temporary ap-
pointment in the Department of Government, and Parsons – already
268
peter brickey lequire and daniel silver
a leading figure in American sociology – was a member of the fledgling
Department of Sociology. Having fled Austria soon after his summary
dismissal from the University of Vienna, Voegelin needed a patron to
help him secure an academic position and financial support, and came
to rely on Parsons as a professional reference (see Voegelin 4/2/1942,
1/16/1943, and 6/9/1944).
But far more connected the two than just a patron-client relationship.
Building on Max Weber, each saw metaphysical and religious aspira-
tions as significant forces driving history. What is more, Parsons and
Voegelin were somewhat liminal figures within their respective aca-
demic communities. In the 1920s, Parsons’ studies in Germany brought
him into intellectual contact with writers like Max Weber, Ferdinand
T€onnies, andWerner Sombart, then barely known in the United States.
In the same decade, Voegelin studied in the United States with John R.
Commons, John Dewey, and Alfred North Whitehead – the last a major
influence on Parsons in the 1930s.
Yet the major point of affinity between Parsons and Voegelin lies
in their common attempt to understand the singular role of religious
values and myths in human society. Both writers aim to steer a middle
course between positivistic description – which reduces the symbolic to
the status of any other human motivation – and idealist speculation –
which cannot account for the ways in which different values become
meaningful to different people in different concrete historical circum-
stances. While not explicitly oriented toward “the axial age debate”, this is
the theoretical problematic which would later set that debate in motion.
Parsons and Voegelin began their correspondence at a point when
the ideas that would occupy them for decades to come were in ferment.
In 1936, Voegelin had published Der autorit€are Staat: Ein Versuch €uber
das €osterreichische Staatsproblem, a qualified defense of state author-
itarianism as the best safeguard of Austrian freedom (Voegelin 1989-
2009, v. 4). Its practical counsel rested on a theoretical critique of the
“pure theory of law” of Hans Kelsen, who had drafted the liberal
Austrian Constitution of 1920, and served as one of Voegelin’s two
Doktorv€ater at the University of Vienna (see Voegelin 9/3/1941).
Around the time of the Anschluss, Voegelin drove the wedge between
himself and Kelsen even deeper with Die politische Religionen (trans-
lated in Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 5: 19-74). This short book expanded
on his earlier studies of race and state ideology (Rasse und Staat and
Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte von Ray bis Carus, both 1933;
translated in Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 2-3), but from a bold new meth-
odological stance. Here he argued that Communism and Nazism alike
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were “inner-worldly religions” that located ultimate meaning not in
a transcendent God, but rather in human institutions of class or state
(Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 5: 50-51). The immediate political crisis, he
suggested, grew from a twisted religious taproot that “secularized minds”
could not grasp, much less eradicate (Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 5: 24).
In marking a turn toward political theology that would occupy him
for much of his career, The Political Religions represented a watershed
moment for Voegelin.3 At the time of the correspondence, Voegelin
was already hard at work on a related project that would occupy him
off and on until 1954, the massive History of Political Ideas.4 Unlike
political theory, “political ideas” consist not of social-scientific
knowledge but of socially efficacious myths, shared beliefs that
serve to create and sustain political group identity. The History
expanded on Voegelin’s early works on the political ideas of race and
state, works with which Parsons seems to have been familiar (see
Voegelin 1/20/1940, Parsons 2/8/1940 and 8/16/1940). In the spring
of 1941,Voegelin was finishing a draft of its chapter on the
Protestant Reformation, under the title “The Great Confusion”
(Voegelin 1989-2009 v. 22: 217-292, and v. 23: 17-69). His claims
about the causes and consequences of John Calvin’s doctrine of
Predestination would take a central place in the correspondence with
Parsons.
Voegelin finally set the History project aside, but would draw on it
heavily in his efforts to construct a new political science in which the
human experience of “world-transcendent divine Being” serves as the
touchstone of order in personal and public life (Voegelin 1989-2009,
v. 15: 68). We can understand and foster democratic political insti-
tutions, Voegelin later argued, only by keenly discerning the theolog-
ical concepts and religious conflicts from which democracy emerged
(see Voegelin 1989-2009 v. 5: 109-128, and v. 11: 59-82). By the early
1950s, Voegelin had come to believe that such discernment required a
creative restoration of Classical political philosophy. This was not out
of nostalgia. Modern industrialization, Voegelin writes, created a
worldwide “pressure toward pragmatic rationality of action” (that is,
reasoning based on empirical observation and instrumental calculation)
as well as a world in which the “romantic revolt and the dream of
3 On political theology in Voegelin, see
LeQuire 2011; on myth, see Hughes 1993.
4 Now published in Voegelin 1989-2009
v. 19-26. Begun as a textbook, the History
soon morphed into a grand attempt to trace
the origins of modern political theory and
ideology, beginning with Hellenism, Rome,
and early Christianity; it was left unfinished
and mostly unpublished at its author’s
death.
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returning to the simple life make no sense at all” (Voegelin 1989-2009,
v. 11: 178-190). Voegelin turns toward transcendence not in rejection of
pragmatic rationality, but in recognition of its inherent limitations.
In The New Science of Politics (1952), Voegelin proclaims that
“positivism,” the reductive attempt to make “the social sciences ‘scientific’
through the methods that as closely as possible resemble the methods
employed in sciences of the external world”, was inadequate to the
task (Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 5: 93). In Science, Politics, and Gnosticism
(1958-1960) he states that German idealism, too, was worse than a
dead-end; Immanuel Kant and his followers presupposed a human
subject magically removed from particular historical context and
purified of all human desires (Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 5: 60-61, 251).
Voegelin argued instead that the methodology proper to theoret-
ically sound political science was “the philosophy of history”. InOrder
and History, vols. 1-3 (1956-1957), he begins to flesh out his ambitious
“new science” by narrating the emergence of political order from
transcendent religious experience in ancient Greece and Israel, and in
pre-Reformation Christianity. This grand (yet ever evolving and never
completed) sacred narrative of civilizational birth and decay supplies
a nobler and truer myth than rival modern ideological constructions.
Voegelin’s acceptance of myth as an expression of truth came slowly
and even grudgingly; in the period of the Parsons correspondence, he
still suggests that political myths are by definition false, a worthy object
of study only because of their power and utility (Voegelin 1989-2009,
v. 19: 225-237). The exchange with Parsons during the early 1940s
played a key role in changing his mind.
Parsons, too, had just issued a major publication, The Structure of
Social Action (1937). In Parsons’ view, “positivism” turns human action
into a function of environment and heredity.5 His book proposed a
“voluntaristic theory of action”, designed to go beyond this reductive
approach. Structure also disputed the narrow conception of decision-
making characteristic of economists who limit behavior to rational
calculations of efficiency. Yet Parsons was equally critical of what he
called “emanationist idealism”, according to which human action
flows more or less automatically from a cultural system, or “spirit of
the times”.
Rather, Parsons argued that norms and values always mediate deci-
sions. To develop this alternative view, he showed how AlfredMarshall,
5 Quite the opposite of beliefs held by Auguste Comte, the father of positivism. See Levine
1980.
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Vilfredo Pareto, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim – each starting
from different assumptions, and working in different national contexts –
independently “converged” on a “voluntaristic” understanding of action.
In this understanding, collective norms and values are conceived as
irreducible elements of human behavior that are always mediated by
concrete situations and exigencies. In thus seeking to provide a “charter
for sociology”, Parsons sparked a debate over sociology’s place among
the human sciences that persists to this day.6 In the meantime, his early
effort to steer a middle course between idealism and positivism left
Parsons suspicious of both.
At the same time, Parsons was preparing new translations of and
introductions to Weber’s institutional theory, then largely unknown in
America. Following his landmark translation of The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism in 1931, in 1947 he added the Theory of
Social and Economic Organization, which includes the first four chapters
of Economy and Society (Weber 1947). This work on Weber fed into
Parsons’ own attempts to connect his theory of action more explicitly with
a theory of structures and institutions, which would start to come to fru-
ition in the 1950s with The Social System (1951) and Towards a General
Theory of Action (1951), but take its fullest form in later works such as
Economy and Society (1956) and Politics and Social Structure (1969).
It is in this connection that we can appreciate Parsons’ studies on
the sources of German anti-Semitism and Nazism, as well as on the
possibilities for building a stable German liberal-democratic state
based on sociological knowledge of the causes of its dysfunction. In his
early letters to Voegelin, Parsons places particular weight on Germany’s
Lutheran heritage. While this emphasis persists, however, his later
papers place less weight on Lutheranism and more on class and status
conflicts and the disruptions caused by rapid industrialization.7
In Germany, however, these general upheavals of modernity, Parsons
argued, were dangerously heightened by a nationalist politics infused
with “romantic, unrealistic emotionalism and yearnings” (quoted in
Gerhardt 2002: 115). Accordingly, perhaps the central challenge of
post-war reconstruction was to build an institutional order in which
“Germans’ romanticizing their nation should become utterly impossible”
(quoted in Gerhardt 2002: 98). While the romantic strain toward
6 See Camic 1989 and on the convergence
concept Yang 1986.
7 One of Parsons’ students did pursue the
religious themes in more detail (Kayser 1961).
And Parsons continued to stress Lutheranism,
as in a letter he wrote to Margaret Mead
on the topic of German reconstruction in
May 1944 (Parsons, letter to Mead, May 19,
1944, quoted in Gerhardt 2002: 113).
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transcendent hopes could (and should) not be eradicated, it might
instead “find an apolitical form of expression” in “industrialism” and
“those elements of modern Germany [.] which are closest to their
counterparts in the democratic countries” (quoted in Gerhardt
2002: 115). In Parsons’ view, then, a crucial task of modern social science
was to discern institutional arrangements that could “secularize” tran-
scendent aspirations and channel them into productive and inclusive uses
rather than destructive and divisive ones. In the correspondence with
Voegelin, which opens with an exchange on the sources of Germany’s
Sonderweg, this aspiration, and the notion of secularization that corre-
sponds with it, are core topics.
From Reformation to World War II: two patterns of secularization
The specter of Nazism lent these theoretical questions a deep sense
of urgency. Voegelin and Parsons take this urgency in two directions.
Looking back, they discuss the lingering effects of Reformation ideas
of transcendence in utopian ambitions endemic to modern society, and
examine how those ambitions explain various strains of anti-Semitism
in Germany and the United States. But they also think together about
how to move forward while acknowledging our heavy dependence on
Reformation traditions, whether this means a revitalization of religion,
or more modestly a robust affirmation of the contemporary relevance
of a cultural heritage that is inseparable from ideas of transcendence.
The exchange begins with a backward glance at the origins of
modern anti-Semitism (Parsons 2/8/1940; Voegelin 9/11/1940). In the
spirit of The Protestant Ethic, both Parsons and Voegelin sought to
explain this seemingly secular form of hatred by exploring its historical
antecedents in the Protestant Reformation.8 In this first substantive
exchange in the correspondence, Parsons and Voegelin experiment with
strategies for connecting divergent attitudes toward a transcendent
realm with divergent orientations toward national, social, and political
missions. In modern Europe, it seemed, world-transcendent religion
had opened up not so much a universal space for cultivating a universal
humanism but instead had generated a novel problem: how does one
8 Key inspiration also came from Ernst
Troeltch’s observations about “the extreme
difficulty of obtaining a stable orientation to
worldly affairs in the Lutheran and Calvin-
istic orientations” (Parsons 9/27/1940).
Catholic France has its own tense dynamics
that Voegelin and Parsons do discuss but in
less detail than the Anglo vs. Germanic ones
(Parsons 5/13/1941; Voegelin 9/11/1940,
enclosure of 5/9/1941, 1/16/1943).
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orient oneself toward “worldly affairs” when “this world” is a pale, even
evil, version of a “higher”, better world?
Voegelin’s letter of September 11, 1940 offers three explanations
for the particularly virulent form of anti-Semitism that had engulfed
Germany (see Gerhardt 2002, p. 85). First, he suggests that Germans
suffered from a feeling of impotence in forging a coherent national
identity: “There never has been a German national ‘society’, a ruling
class setting standards of conduct as in the Western political commu-
nities”. Without a core national cultural image, such as the English
gentleman or the French bourgeois, Germans suffered acute anxiety
about who they really are, and became susceptible to radical political
programs that offered hope for a coherent collective identity.
Second, Voegelin traces German racial anxiety back to psychological
traits fostered by “a permanent German tendency”, which stressed the
“ultimate loneliness of the human personality”, sufficient unto itself.
This monadic inwardness, Voegelin suggests, is analogous to the Jewish
idea of the Chosen People, which likewise generated a kind of insularity.
“This Monadologism has in German history, I think, a function similar
to the Jewish belief in the chosen people, and prevents the free for-
mation of contacts and social openness.” While Jewish insularity serves
to knit together a community, however, Germanic-Lutheran inwardness
initially creates a social vacuum. This vacuum is later filled by monadic
individuals highly desirous of community, conjoined merely by a mutual
envy of the people whose religiousness largely consists in communal
life. But monads cannot co-exist in the same space; there can be only
one. The co-mingling of German and Jew creates competition between
two “chosen peoples”. German “monadology” thus deems the presence
of Jews acutely intolerable, generating a “special cause of anti-Semitism
in Germany” that is absent elsewhere.
Third, Voegelin sees in German anti-Semitism a curious brand of
self-destructive anti-Christianity that can be addressed “only on the
religious level”, not purely sociologically. Voegelin somewhat cryptically
alludes to the Nazi unease with the universalistic message of Christ: that
through him all may be redeemed, regardless of merit or lineage. Jews of
course stubbornly refuse this good news. The result is a novel form of
anti-Semitism: the persistence of the Jews in their refusal of Christ
becomes intolerable to anti-Christian Germans because it stands as a
reminder of Jesus’ redemptive promise. To get rid of that disturbing core
of the Gospel, one would need to get rid of those whose existence re-
minds us that there was a messiah to refuse in the first place (9/11/1940;
see Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 2: 180-206 and v. 10: 27-61).
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Voegelin acknowledges (implicitly here, explicitly in his letter of
1/16/1943) that German anti-Semitism might emerge from a pattern
of secularization peculiar to Lutheran peoples. But he takes a grim
view of both branches of the Reformation. Parsons, by contrast, draws
a sharp distinction between Calvinism and Lutheranism. In his reply to
Voegelin’s observation about the social-psychological stress created by
the lack of a strong national character, Parsons argues that Germany is
not unique in this regard. America, too, lacks a unifying iconic cultural
image, and, as a result, exhibits a similar inferiority complex. But if this
sense of inferiority leads Americans to be somewhat prone to anti-
Semitism, which Parsons thinks it does, he does grant a distinction, one
grounded in contrasting attitudes toward “the world” in the Lutheran
and Calvinist traditions. This is because the Calvinist injunction to
build up the Kingdom of God on earth licenses strong social enforce-
ment of Christian ethical principles. Lutheranism, on the other hand,
views the world as “frankly and inevitably evil”, which weakens the
“force of the obligation of Christian charity”. The result is that “we are
considerably better protected against mass outbursts of this kind of
utterly un-Christian aggression than Germany has been” (9/27/1940).
Parsons again highlights the Calvinist difference in his response to
Voegelin’s point regarding the psychological effects of being chosen.
Calvinists, he notes, operate with a “Chosen People” idea of their own:
the righteous Army of the Elect. But the Calvinist strain is more self-
confident, less marked by the “acceptance and expectation of perse-
cution”, less linked to nostalgic memories of a heroic past, and more
influenced by a long tradition of theological reflection on religious and
civil community. The Germanic-Lutheran version, by contrast, contains
notes of melancholy and defeatism, which swell into resentment toward
groups who can live on “that order of hope” that messianic belief implies.
To make matters worse, as Nazism begins to propose its own utopia in
the form of the Third Reich, “which outdoes anything certainly in
the main traditions of western Europe and is at least as unrealistic as the
socialists’ Utopia”, it overcompensates for its pessimist roots, and lashes
out at the Jews with a “particular hatred because of their competitive
similarity in this respect” (9/27/1940). The Nazis declared themselves
the true and exclusive bearers of these universalities.
Finally, Parsons answers Voegelin’s third point about the
anti-Christian character of German anti-Semitism. Christianity, he
writes, drives the emergence of “positivistic rationalism” and, at the very
same time, breeds various types of anti-rational, anti-scientific
“fundamentalisms”: “the conflict which is put, among other things, as
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the conflict between science and religion in our culture reflects an inner
tension in a single great tradition rather than the ultimate conflict of
opposed traditions” (9/27/1940). Nazism, Parsons suggests, is of a piece
with this fundamentalist orientation within Christianity. But rather
than attack its Christian “brothers”, Nazism finds a convenient symbol
of the deracinating, corrosive effects of rationalism in the Jews.
Through a bizarre inversion, Nazis transmute their abhorrence toward
the universalistic message of Jesus Christ into a hatred of Jews, made all
the more virulent because it was really displaced insecurity in the form
of hatred toward the Nazis’ own cultural heritage (9/27/1940).9
The specifically Judeo-Christian form of transcendence generates
uniquely dangerous inner strains between a critical-theoretical stance
orientated toward rational knowledge and a utopian stance oriented
toward otherworldly redemption.
With this last point, Parsons links religion and science, and thereby
turns the correspondence in a new direction. The tension between
religion and science is a tension within the Christian tradition, not
a tension between Christianity and some external “other”. The other is
within. Subsequent letters between May and October 1941 turn on
the question of why this is and what it means for the social scientist.
Voegelin’s comments on Calvin launch the conversation toward
the subtle links between varieties of transcendent religion, modern
utopian politics, and modern rationalism. In his letter of 8/1/1941,
Parsons expresses great “surprise” at Voegelin’s interpretation of Calvin.
The central issue (not surprisingly) was the doctrine of Predestination,
a matter that, Voegelin admits, “rests heavy on my soul” (8/4/1941).
Parsons comes to the question with eyes trained by Weber’s Protestant
Ethic, expecting to find an account of how the doctrine, psychologically
if not logically, stimulates active mastery over the world (8/1/1941).
Instead, Voegelin investigates in great detail the logical meaning of
the doctrine, especially the theological tensions in Calvin’s version of
it (10/19/1941).
Yet despite these expectations, Parsons concedes that the Weberian
account is “not the whole story” (8/1/1941). Ascetic Protestantism
depends not only on rationalizing religious concepts, but also on granting
“the attribution of fundamental religious and emotional significance to
a certain range of religious problems revolving about the state of grace”
(8/1/1941). Here again Parsons points to differences between Calvinism,
9 Gerhardt 1993 gathers Parsons’ work
on these topics from this period, but the
question of the causes of anti-Semitism
and Communism would continue to pre-
occupy him (in e.g. Parsons 1951, 1971,
and 2006).
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Catholicism, and Lutheranism. For the Calvinist, grace “cannot be made
dependent on the summation or balancing of particular good works
which could be built into a traditionalistic ethic”, as in Catholicism.
Nor can grace be “dissociated from the active moral responsibility
in secular affairs”, as in Lutheranism. Instead, the doctrine of
Predestination offers “one polar solution” to the problem of how to
make theological sense of the religious experience of grace.
Without denying the Weberian claims, Voegelin points not toward
the effects of the doctrine of predestination but toward the question of
what caused Calvin to assign it such theological weight. Here again, we
find Voegelin and Parsons treating the various transcendental ori-
entations within the Judeo-Christian tradition as sources of new
anxieties and problems that can be taken in different directions,
depending on factors like national history and geography – even
personality (see Parsons 8/18/1941). Voegelin’s interpretation of
Calvinism surprisingly stresses the latter, and concludes that Calvin’s
personal character above all explains the disproportional significance of
Predestination in Calvin’s theology. Calvin was a political man of
action, “a statesman and ecclesiastical imperialist”. Luther, on the other
hand, had all the “talents one should like to see in an influential cabinet
member of a democratic welfare state” (Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 22: 248).
For Calvin, the doctrine of predestination acts as the drum march for
an army of the elect, united not just by church sacraments or personal
mystical experiences but directly by God’s choosing. “Problems of
action”, not “religious experiences connected with the state of grace”,
required a doctrine of Predestination (8/4/1941).
The “problem of action” in question was how to establish the
Kingdom of God on earth. Calvin’s creed, moreover, again in contrast
to Luther, drew on “imagery strongly Old Testament; the chosen people,
not the chosen individual captured his imagination” (8/4/1941). In Paul’s
Epistle to the Romans, “symbols connected with the fate of Israel” drew
Calvin’s attention. On Voegelin’s reading, Calvinism marks a return to
the Judaic-prophetic task of forging a collective orientation around a
transcendent mission, now given a peculiar activist zeal through
the “great deal of insecurity” that beset Calvin, which could only
be “overcome through the intoxication [.] of action” (8/4/1941).
Transcendence engenders doubt, which in turn, in the specific form
of anxiety that beset Calvin, generates impatience with theological
speculation and impetus toward exuberant action.
In attributing the salience of the doctrine of transcendence to
Calvin’s anxieties about redemption, Voegelin aimed to link Calvinist
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theology to the millenarian politics characteristic of Calvinist peoples
(8/4/1941). Calvin’s peculiar inflection of a familiar Christian doctrine
was for Voegelin in fact a politically motivated betrayal of the tradition
represented by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas: “He liked the doc-
trine because it suited his temperament and his plans for organizing a
Protestant International in rivalry with the Catholic Church”.
It is obvious why this line of thinking would appear counter-
intuitive to Parsons, especially given that it punctuates a conversation
on modern anti-Semitism. Voegelin had neither explained the rela-
tionship between Germany’s Lutheran past and its Nazi present, nor
shown how his portrait of Calvinist activism corresponded to the political
landscape of the twentieth-century United States. Even if those were not
Voegelin’s precise goals in the History, Parsons is in good company in
being “a little surprised” by Voegelin’s passion for tracing political ideas
to their origins, which could at times make him seem inattentive to vital
political differences in the present day (see, e.g., Arendt 1953).
Searching for common ground, perhaps, Parsons, citing Weber,
Whitehead, and Robert Merton, immediately draws a somewhat
different connection, to modern science. Calvin’s interest in worldly
action over theological speculation, Parsons suggests, may lay the foun-
dation for Anglo-Saxon empiricism and its distaste for metaphysics.
“The fact that instead of getting bogged down in [.] philosophical
problems these men proceeded with scientific observation and gener-
alization is at least partly to be attributed to the fact that their faith
directly inhibited philosophical refinement” (8/18/1941). This obser-
vation becomes fundamental in Parsons’ and Voegelin’s discussion of
Alfred Sch€utz: “Possibly one of my troubles in my discussion with
Sch€utz lies in the fact that by cultural heritage I am a Calvinist. I do not
want to be a philosopher” (8/18/1941). Parsons’ mention of his dispute
with Sch€utz, which seems at first to interrupt the dialogue about
Luther, Calvin, and Weber, in fact extends that dialogue, as Parsons
shifts from the political to the scientific heritage of transcendent re-
ligious traditions.
The methodology of social science
Voegelin’s very first letter to Parsons (1/20/1940) commends Sch€utz,
whom Parsons had recently met, as “really an excellent theorist”.
By November of the same year, however, this theorist had written
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a long, unpublished critique of The Structure of Social Action that
raised fundamental questions about Parsons’ conception of action
(in Grathoff 1978: 8-60), and provoked Parsons to a defensive response
(in Grathoff 1978, pp. 63-70, 72-93). The defensiveness was under-
standable, for Sch€utz had effectively, if unintentionally, asked Parsons
to endorse these criticisms (Grathoff 1978: 5). Resuming their corre-
spondence after a roughly seven-month hiatus, Voegelin next mentions
Sch€utz to Parsons (5/9/1941) by way of recounting how he (Voegelin)
came to acquire a copy of Parsons’ “Actor, Situation, and Normative
Pattern” (published in German translation in 1986 and finally in
English as Parsons 2011). This mention of Sch€utz was almost cer-
tainly a subtle offer to “mediate” in the intellectual and personal facets
of the relationship between Parsons and Sch€utz, both of which had
become strained. In the event, Parsons eagerly enlisted Voegelin’s help
as “an impartial critic” who might help identify the sources of misun-
derstandings between him and Sch€utz (5/13/1941).
Voegelin obligingly gives Parsons a kind of sociological-
anthropological picture of the state of German and Austrian social
science. In Voegelin’s telling, Austrian social science was dominated
by frankly speculative questions stemming from a neo-Kantian focus
on “self-conscious reflection on the instruments of perception and
conception” rather than on the “object of science” (9/3/1941). In that
context, Parsons’ approach had to seem “naı¨ve” – an accusation leveled
by Sch€utz to which Parsons took particular offence. What Sch€utz
meant by this charge, Voegelin explains, was not that Parsons was a
childish naı¨f, but that his stance did not amount to a transcendental
“critique” in the Kantian sense of the term (see Grathoff 1978: xii).
Parsons sought a “theory of society” rather than a theory of the
perceptual and cognitive apparatus by which knowledge of society
is conditioned. Because Sch€utz aimed for the latter, even though he
and Parsons used similar words like “action” and “meaning”, they
ended up talking past one another, much to their mutual frustration:
“you and Sch€utz are interested in different levels of abstraction of
social theory; your focus of interest is nearer to the empirical problems,
his interest is nearer to the level of abstraction where the time-structure
of human action becomes central” (9/3/1941). To use Kantian language,
Sch€utz was interested in transcendental questions about the conditions of
the possibility of social action and social science; Parsons was interested
in devising an analytical scheme for observing social action scientifically.
If indifference toward transcendental speculation is naı¨vete, then it
is a kind of naı¨vete that Parsons embraced, even if he still bridled at
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the term. “By contrast with the naı¨ve (in the naı¨ve sense) empiricism
of so much of American and English social science, I was initially
attracted by the atmosphere of serious concern with methodological
issues [at Heidelberg]. But, looking back, I think it is fair to say that I
never really became profoundly interested in those things” (10/2/1941).
What explains the two attitudes toward social science? Parsons here
pursues the surprising comparison we noted above by drawing a link
to Voegelin’s interpretation of Calvinist antipathy to metaphysical
speculation. If that antipathy blinded Calvin’s followers to theological
inconsistencies in his thought, it also freed them from torturing them-
selves with such difficulties and allowed them to get on with the business
of scientifically ordering and pragmatically mastering the world. Parsons
clearly enjoys envisioning himself as the heir to this stance, as when he
notes that Weber’s The Protestant Ethic was uniquely transformative for
him, “in the first place I suppose because the phenomena he was talking
about were basic to my own cultural tradition” (10/2/1941). Parsons
sensed that his Calvinist dispositions let him set aside speculative dramas
(familiar to him from his Heidelberg days), so as to get to work on
building a systematic theory of society grounded in the “‘Western’ tra-
ditions of science”. “However important from various points of view
of philosophy and Weltanschauung the other level of abstraction may
be, I feel considerable confidence that it is not capable of the same
order of empirical fruitfulness, at least in its present state of
development” (10/2/1941). Able in this way to discern potential social
tensions, Parsons, like an engineer or, better, a doctor, could propose
practical cures founded in reasoned observations at “a high level of
generalization” (see Gerhardt 1993: 243-274, 291-324).
Parsons’ indifference to metaphysical questions is neither unreflective
nor a-theoretical. In fact, he offers in these letters an intriguing if
compact account of the foundations and legitimacy of his brand of social
theorizing. The resulting picture differs markedly from the conventional
portrait of Parsons as a sort of sociological Platonist (e.g.Gouldner 1971).
Parsons’ social theory appears in these letters as historical rather than
aprioristic – a scientific world-view that rests on an antecedent religious
disposition or cultural heritage. Far from just a descriptive, genealogical
claim, his theory suggests how to think and act in light of the con-
temporary political crisis: if “the Calvinistic branch of Protestantism”,
Parsons writes, has been able to combine a “deeper religious orientation”
with a “highly mechanized civilization”, the “Catholic heritage” has been
“notably incapable” of this synthesis. “The Germans” too are “incapable
of standing” the tension between modern science and fundamental
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religious conviction without “going off into such nightmares as Nazism.”
The social-scientific analog to this unease with the modern world,
Parsons seems to be suggesting, is Sch€utzian speculative thought.
“I shy away from the philosophical problems underlying my scientific
work. By the same token I don’t think [Sch€utz] wants to be a scientist
as I understand the term until he has settled all the underlying phil-
osophical difficulties. If the physicists of the 17th century had been
Sch€utzes there might well have been no Newtonian system” (8/18/1941).
(Implicit is a comparison of Sch€utz to Leibniz, who faulted Newton
for failing to explain the causal mechanism behind gravitation.) On the
one hand, Parsons links a contemporary social-scientific debate about
the nature of social action to a sixteenth-century religious debate about
the salvation of the soul. On the other, he links a debate about scientific
progress in general to the ability to endure, and at times release, the
personal anxieties generated by critical reflection on the transcendental
conditions of human knowledge and action. Nothing less than our
“orientation to the modern situation”, is at stake (5/13/1941).
Parsons here advocates a scientific attitude that we call “critical
naı¨vete”. The philosophical problems raised by transcendental reflec-
tion are best solved (in a psychological if not logical sense) not by
speculation but by setting them aside when they become empirically
unproductive. To those who know Voegelin only by his reputation as
a critic of quantitative empiricism, his affinity for the attitude Parsons
describes may come as a surprise. Throughout the correspondence
Voegelin sides with Parsons over Sch€utz – that is, for theories of society
and against speculative metaphysics of the conditions of the possibility
of social science.
This unfeigned sympathy is more than a tactic to smooth things
over between Parsons and Sch€utz. Of course Voegelin may have been
tempted to flatter Parsons, and not just for his own sake. Before Voegelin
even met Parsons, he expressed hope that the latter might serve as a
professional reference for his fellow emigre (Voegelin 1989-2009, vol. 29,
pp. 184-187). Sch€utz was Voegelin’s best friend – they had been close
as students in Vienna, and stayed in touch faithfully until Sch€utz’s
death in 1959 (see Sch€utz and Voegelin 2004, Sch€utz and Voegelin
2011). Even afterwards, writes Voegelin, Sch€utz ever remained
“the silent partner in my thinking”. He and Sch€utz “had in common
the project of designating [...] a theory of social action and of political
order. In regard to concrete efforts, however, our ways parted”
(Voegelin 1989-2009, vol. 6: 41-42). Their intellectual differences
are well attested. Indeed, Voegelin had for years been drifting away
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from his Austrian colleagues, including Hans Kelsen, on these very
questions. The reader of Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas – an
effort to bring historical scholarship to bear on theological, political,
and metaphysical matters, not the other way around – can see this drift
taking place. It is, perhaps, telling that Voegelin showed Parsons
manuscripts from the History that he did not send to Sch€utz
(see Voegelin 1/16/1942). Voegelin, too, was on a path toward “critical
naivete”, toward an intellectual stance that could accept truth claims
about a transcendent reality beyond material existence. Unlike Parsons,
Voegelin’s challenge – as heir to a tradition affirmed with conviction but
not apodictic certainty – was to move from Sch€utzian critique toward
a more pragmatic stance and to cultivate thereby the ability to think
and act.
The meaning of Max Weber
To use Weberian terminology, Parsons and Voegelin find them-
selves on the same side of the fence that divides otherworldly-passive
attitudes toward science from innerworldly-active attitudes. Both agree
that the scientific endeavor should orient itself more toward action and
empirical fruitfulness than toward metaphysical speculation. Yet when
it comes to the question of what it means to stand on this side of the
fence, a gulf opens. This divide becomes apparent in their exchange
about Parsons’ relationship to Weber. Weber reopened the problem of
transcendence as a question for social scientists – on this Voegelin and
Parsons agree. But what does this Weberian legacy mean for working
social thinkers? With this question the correspondents part ways.
On Voegelin’s reading, Parsons’ systematic theory of institutions,
while inspired by Weber, neither extends nor completes Weber’s
project. It is instead an instance of Parsons’ own intellectual creativity.
“[I]t would seem to me that biographically your own thought may be
determined to a certain extent through your analysis and criticism of
Weber, but that essentially your approach is new. You attack Weber’s
problem, the analysis of our civilization, from the pole that is opposite
to his, and that was never accessible to him, from the pole of primary
systematic thought” (9/24/1941). For Voegelin (as for Karl Jaspers
before him), Weber’s writings are essentially fragmentary: “he never
placed himself in the center of systematic thought in order to organize the
materials from such a center (9/24/1941)”. In Voegelin’s interpretation
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of Weber, the fragments gathered together as Economy and Society are
not notes toward a future system but evidence of the inherently
contingent and halting character of the creative intellect.
Parsons sharply disagrees with this interpretation of Weber
(10/2/1941). Weber, he insists, was on to something that he himself
could not fully realize and that was left to his followers (Parsons
included) to piece together into a coherent system. But that Weber
would welcome this eventuality goes for Parsons without question.
Indeed, what makes the experience of reading Weber so different from
reading “mere” historians, Parsons adds, is the unrelenting effort to
order historical material according to a comprehensive analytical scheme
(10/2/1941). For Parsons, Weber pointed the way toward a unifying
analytical scheme for the social sciences; for Voegelin, Weber pointed
toward precisely the impossibility of such a scheme.
The divide opening between Parsons and Voegelin would only
yawn wider. With a kind of passion that to many observers veered
close to a form of madness, Parsons would over the ensuing decades
pursue the grail of a systematically unified theory of action. Voegelin
reframed his own project more than once, following a pivotal series of
conversations with Sch€utz in 1943 (to which their respective exchanges
with Parsons may well have been a backdrop), pursuing the same ques-
tions, but never quite settling on an approach. For all their ambition,
neither the philosophy of history he developed in the 1950s, nor the
philosophy of consciousness he elaborated from the 1960s onward,
aspired to empirical systematicity. His latest writings, which address the
mysteries of human participation in Being, are barely recognizable as
the work of a professional social scientist; they represent a speculative,
contemplative stance closer to Sch€utz than to Parsons.
Or so it would seem. As we have noted, Voegelin remained friends
with Sch€utz, while his correspondence with Parsons slackened and
soon stopped altogether. However, his reflections on the relationship
with Sch€utz also shed light on his attitude toward the kind of work
that continued to occupy the Harvard sociologist. True, Voegelin in-
creasingly occupied himself with ancient texts and his own philosophy
of history and consciousness. But he also held fast to the belief that
even if modern empirical research on human action – and a theoret-
ically coherent synthesis of that research – were not his own vocation,
they were essential to modern political science. Indeed, Voegelin would
subsequently express his greatest praise for Sch€utz’s approach to social
theory precisely when Sch€utz in 1955 came to accept “the social
world as a historical given that is impenetrable to phenomenology”
283
parsons-voegelin correspondence
(Voegelin 1989-2009, vol. 6, p. 43). For (the later) Voegelin, Sch€utz
supplies an appropriate theory of action – but only once he aban-
doned the epistemological position that caused his initial clash with
Parsons.
All this appears in Voegelin’s encomium on Sch€utz’s life and work
as a whole, in which Sch€utz’s is one example among others of an
adequate theory of action. To read this as an implicit vindication of
Parsons would be going too far; Voegelin in fact cites Parsons very
infrequently, so we will refrain from speculation as to his opinion of
Parsons after their correspondence ended. Nevertheless, a careful
consideration of the correspondence yields a fresh perspective on
how Voegelin understood his own philosophical work in its relation
to the academic landscape of the day. We might even conjecture that
Voegelin’s labors in rarified historical arcana were made possible by
the conviction that theoretically-based empirical social science was
already headed down the right track.
This conjecture makes sense if and only if personal differences, not
professional disagreements, led to their parting of ways. The corre-
spondence and other primary sources would seem to suggest otherwise.
Whereas in the early 1940s Parsons and Voegelin seem to have been in
relatively frequent personal contact, by the 1960s they had certainly
grown apart.10 And it is precisely after the discussion of Weber that the
correspondence loses its intellectual energy, and subsequent letters
become rather perfunctory.
The seemingly small interpretive quibble over Weber went far
deeper than a professional dispute. At stake, ultimately, was not
Weber’s scholarly corpus, nor Weber’s biography, but the character
of Weber as a charismatic personality, admired by a generation of
scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. To Parsons, Weber was akin
to a sociological John Calvin, an activist systematizer whose intellectual
merits were attested by the fruits of those scholars working to
extend his conceptual architecture. To Voegelin, in contrast, Weber
was a sociological Socrates, whose writings were essentially frag-
mentary because Weber, like Socrates, lived zetetically, in constant
awareness of his own essential ignorance. The interpretive dis-
agreement is not a methodological quarrel by proxy, but rather an
expression of radically different assessments of a common intellectual
forebear.
10 Lidz, personal communication to Daniel Silver, May 3, 2013.
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Transcendence and social science
Whatever Parsons’ and Voegelin’s later divergences, that such
different intellectual types, blazing such different intellectual paths,
were able, however briefly, to undertake such a fruitful dialogue is
itself quite remarkable.11 This fruitfulness demonstrates the potency
of transcendence as a subject of reflection. Reflections on the impor-
tance of world-transcendence occasions self-reflection on the as-
sumptions and motivations driving the social scientist. While the
correspondents drew different implications from these reflections on
transcendence, politics, and social science, the questions themselves
continue to resonate.
Parsons and Voegelin carried on their discourse about transcendence
in private. But just a few years later, Karl Jaspers’ Vom Ursprung und
Ziel der Geschichte (1949), and “the Axial Age” debate it sparked, would
make a similar discourse public. In the first millennium BCE, Jaspers
argued, societies worldwide underwent a process of “spiritualization”.
Human beings aspired to understand themselves and the world from
outside and above, turning a critical eye on the narrative imagery of
myth and the authority of tradition. They started to develop an idea of
“the transcendent”, distinguishing mundane from ultimate reality
(whether understood as a personal God or impersonal Being).
Voegelin and Parsons both came to be key participants in ensuing
debates about the significance of the axial period in particular
(even when they do not use that term) and of transcendence in general.
Their letters show why they were primed for this topic – each was train-
ing himself to trace contemporary social and political issues relentlessly
back to their deep religious wellsprings. What is more, setting aside the
intricacies of the Axial Age debate, the letters teach us something about
what attracted thinkers like Parsons and Voegelin to this dynamic period
of human history, namely, its dialogical value as a meeting point for
diverse scholars to think through basic questions about their own work,
and to be transformed in the process.12
One of the attractions of Jaspers’ idea of the Axial Age, especially in
the immediate post-War years, is the way it suggested deep points of
convergence across seemingly highly divergent cultures. This political
11 For a different assessment, see Buxton
and Rehorick 2001.
12 See Joas 2012 and LeQuire 2010 for
similar arguments about the Axial Age debate
as contemporary “religious discourse” and
“political discourse”, respectively.
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connection is clearly evident in the Parsons-Voegelin exchange, as
noted above. Less clear in current discussions of the Axial Age debate
is the link between transcendence and modern social science. As we
saw in the letters, however, this connection is crucial. Both Parsons
and Voegelin hold that contemporary attitudes toward scientific ratio-
nalism are rooted in historical experiences of religious transcendence.
Each conception of transcendence – Platonic, Buddhist, Confucian,
Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, etc. – advances a specific attitude toward
nature, society, thought, and their interrelationship. Parsons puts the
point most bluntly: “It seems to me that anything like modern Western
rationalism would be utterly incomprehensible on a basis of orientation
like that, for instance, of India or China” (9/27/40). This is neither a
religious claim, nor merely a historical one. Rather, it is a claim about
the conditions of the possibility of social science as we know it – a
transcendental claim, in the Kantian sense. But unlike formally similar
claims by Kant or Sch€utz, for instance, which begin and end with
epistemological questions, it exhibits a scientist’s open trust in the
validity of an intellectual tradition shaped by religious notions of
transcendence. Yet such open trust also implies that initial ori-
entations be left open to revision and re-interpretation through
dialogue. Parsons’ ongoing interest in the axial period and its
contemporary resonances shows this openness, as he took a more
critical attitude toward Western rationalism and included meta-
physical ideas in ways in which he might have balked at during his
discourse with Voegelin.
Building on interests already apparent in the correspondence with
Voegelin, Parsons’ later work offers a more sustained examination of
the axial period. Parsons worked closely with a young Robert Bellah,
extending the latter’s notion of “historic” societies. In Societies:
Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (1966) and The System of
Modern Societies (1971), he also developed his own idea of “seedbed
societies”. Though clearly rooted in Weberian comparative sociology,
these concepts bear strong similarities to the Axial Age idea. They aim
to compare and evaluate the evolutionary potential of alternative
conceptions and institutionalizations of transcendence across Israel,
Greece, China, and India. In Parsons’ terms: the “philosophic break-
throughs to higher levels of generalization in the constitutive symbolic
systems of their cultures” occurred during the “middle of the first
millennium B.C.” (Parsons 1966, p. 70).
Parsons’ analysis of the axial period maintains the general orientation
of the exchange with Voegelin. He was interested primarily in
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discerning the “most crucial ingredients of modernity”, and sought to
evaluate why different “breakthroughs” (notably those of China, India,
Islam, and Rome) failed to “evolve into modern societies”. (Their
failures, Parsons stresses, were not “at the level of values” but
concerned the “complex mode of integrating values with the many
differentiated conditions of a complex society in a complex environ-
ment”) (Parsons 1966: 94). Yet Parsons’ later writings also exhibit
a stronger critical stance toward Western rationalism, as he embraced
certain aspects of the counter-cultural critiques of the 1960s as part of
a thoroughgoing “expressive revolution” (even if he was worried about
some of the excesses of the counter-culture) (Parsons 1978: 300-330).
While never straying from his commitment to the Protestant ethic as
a social value, he saw in the counter-culture a rekindling of early
Christian themes of love, as well as a new opening toward bodily
attunement and natural beauty, and hoped these might provoke
productive dialogue with Eastern traditions (Parsons 1978: 320-
322). Parsons, that is to say, approached the great religious and
philosophic traditions with a view to the present. In his hands,
those traditions modeled more or less successful ways of dealing
with basic problems of socio-cultural integration, and supplied rich
repositories of powerful cultural symbols that for good or ill could be
drawn on by contemporary actors.
At the same time, Parsons in his later years turned toward spec-
ulative issues. He found new inspiration in Kant – not the rationalist
Kant of the First Critique or the moralist Kant of the Second Critique,
but the aesthetic Kant of the Third Critique, who sought to mediate
“from the human point of view, between the necessities of the empirical
world and the freedom of the world of morality” (Parsons 1978: 339).
This return to Kant was joined by a novel extension of Parsons’ theo-
retical apparatus toward frankly metaphysical questions, as he added
a new “telic” level to his system that stood beyond even culture, con-
stituting the ultimate realities that lay back of any social system
(Parsons 1978: 352-433). Parsons did not approach these realities
with the phenomenologists’ pathos of re-enchanting mundane social life
through rich description. But he did assert that any proper scientific
description of human social order must include some account of the
metaphysical backdrop of that order, and an analysis of how they inter-
face. For existing in reference to such a backdrop is an irreducible part
of “the human condition”.
If Parsons’ later engagement with questions of transcendence
evinces a shift toward the “critical” end of the “critical-naı¨ve”
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spectrum, Voegelin initially moves in the other direction. Voegelin
objected to Jaspers’ terminology but took up Jaspers’ thesis directly.
In fact, Voegelin adopted it nearly verbatim as a central part of The
New Science of Politics (1952) (Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 5: 135-136),
and critically yet sympathetically appropriated and responded to it
in Order and History vols. 1-3 (1956-1957), Anamnesis (1966), and
Order and History, vol. 4 (1974). In the 1950s, Voegelin agreed that
the discovery of transcendence, which he termed the “leap in being”,
occurred at roughly the same time in Israelite prophecy, in Greek tragedy
and philosophy, and in the religious reforms and mystical speculations of
the Chinese and Indian sages.
Like Parsons, Voegelin highlights the scientific nature of the axial
breakthroughs. The discovery of transcendence, he argues, provides the
basis for descriptive political science, because it leads to the realization that
different religious and philosophical stances define individual human
beings’ characters, and “every society reflects the type of men of whom it
is composed” (Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 5: 137). In other words, in order to
understand a society we must understand the religious attitudes of its
members and distinguish between transcendental and non-transcendental
spirituality. Voegelin had long been interested in what accounted for
differences in “national types of mind”, i.e. the different complexes of
symbols and experiences that characterized various political groupings.
Armed with the Axial Age thesis (in Order and History, vol. 1), he is able
to work toward a general typology that distinguishes between societies
organized in “cosmological form” (such as Pharaonic Egypt), which lack a
distinction between immanence and transcendence, and those organized
in “historical form” (such as the Israel depicted in the more recent
passages of the Hebrew Bible), which are heirs to the axial “leap in
being”. The former type tend to legitimate their political authority by
attributing divine or quasi-divine status to their rulers; the latter
distinguish between the necessity of earthly, human rule and the ultimate
yet unseen rule of God.
The distinction might have been lost on the Israelites, who in
Voegelin’s interpretation made but did not critically reflect on their
own “leap” into transcendence. The philosophers of ancient Greece,
however, did. Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of transcendence
(as opposed to those of the Reformation) are highly “critical”, nearly
devoid of positive content and, for that reason, prone to reflective self-
consciousness. It is in Greece that the discovery of transcendence –
articulated chiefly in philosophical, not religious terms – first produces
a robust theory of politics, understood as the science of mundane human
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action. In all axial cases, this realization of transcendence serves a
normative function as “an instrument of social critique”, allowing
for the development of what Voegelin (following Henri Bergson) calls
“the open society” (Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 5: 136-137). But in their
breakthroughs the ancient Greeks gave the most thorough articula-
tion of this basic critical stance, a normative science that will serve as
the basis of Voegelin’s proposed antidote to Weber’s noble yet
nihilistic value-free social science.13 This is a far cry from Parsons’
evolutionary theory – and yet there is a surprising commonality,
namely, the conviction that social science must acknowledge not only
the historical influence of transcendence, but also its ongoing role in
orienting human action.
In later years, Voegelin rejected the view that spiritual break-
throughs to transcendence could be fit neatly into a single chronological
period, however broad. As he writes in Order and History, vol. 4 (1974),
“There was no ‘axis time’ in the first millennium B.C.” (Voegelin 1989-
2009, v. 17: 50; cf. Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 17: 276). Yet he acknowledges
Jaspers’ “feat of philosophical insight” in attributing axial significance
to a set of spiritual events. He agrees that the consciousness of epoch
produced by the experiential encounter with divine transcendence
allows for key advancements in human self-understanding (Voegelin
1989-2009, v. 17: 382-383). However, by the time Voegelin acknowl-
edges his full debt to Jaspers, his thinking has already headed in another
direction. With increasing conceptual refinement, he delves deeper and
deeper into the structure of human consciousness. Though he seems to
lose interest in the Axial Age, as his thinking matured, he sought to
incorporate not only divine transcendence, but also the generic divine
reality that is the source of human religious experience in all its forms.
It is hard to say whether the older Voegelin grew more critical or more
naı¨ve. What is certain, though, is that his scholarly work became
through the 1960s and 1970s less political, as his personal political
opinions reportedly drifted rightward – another difference with Parsons
that serves to highlight the remarkable character of their relatively brief
Briefwechsel. It bears repeating that Jaspers inaugurates the Axial Age
debate not with the statement of a theory, but with an article of
“philosophical faith”. In a similar way, Voegelin’s critical appropriation
of the Axial Age thesis at the height of his career is in fact part of
13 In Voegelin’s view, the achievements
of Greek normative theory include incipi-
ent individualism within society, but also,
and perhaps more importantly, the birth of
universalism, understood as the recognition of
the essential similarity of all human beings,
regardless of political identity or social status
(Voegelin 1989-2009, v. 5: 142-143).
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a grand attempt to create a philosophical myth that is transparent as
such, and efficacious to the extent that it has a sound basis in
scholarship.
Parsons’ scholarship is not particularly mythological; yet it is possible
only in a world shaped by narratives of transcendence. In his case, in-
creasingly reflective consciousness of these narratives is not only infor-
mative from a speculative standpoint, but fruitful from a scientific one.
More prosaically, his contributions to the Axial Age debate, both directly
and through his students, helped institutionalize inter-methodological
and inter-disciplinary dialogue. While the correspondence with Voegelin
does not seem to have served as a model, we nevertheless note that this
singular exchange – made possible by a mutual concern for the way dif-
fering attitudes toward transcendence produce different individual and
collective attitudes toward the world – played a decisive part in Parsons’
distinctive brand of critical naı¨vete, which seems both a consequence and
a precondition of engagement in the Axial Age debate. The Parsons-
Voegelin correspondence brings the contours and stakes of the Axial Age
debate into sharper focus, but also provides an indispensable and com-
plementary pair of perspectives on how the debate functions as an idiom
of critical reflection on social-scientificmethodology, even among thinkers
whose basic methodological orientations could not, on the surface, seem
more different.
Conclusion
Our interpretation of the correspondence might surprise readers
who, quite rightly, see Parsons and Voegelin as representatives of
different traditions, motivated by different concerns, and engaged in
increasingly divergent intellectual enterprises. It might seem a tall
order to prove that their differences can be harmonized. Yet the
amicability of their correspondence and their ability to reach mutual
understanding, and quickly, suggest there is more to their relationship
than first meets the eye.
Parsons was, by cultural heritage, an American Calvinist; Voegelin
was – by heritage and upbringing, if not by conviction – a German
Lutheran, albeit one educated in Catholic and cosmopolitan Vienna.
Unlike other intellectual emigres of his generation, Voegelin avoided
both coasts and instead chose to live for nearly thirty years in the
South. He was reportedly confident and congenial in person, but his
reader cannot quite shake the impression that on some level Voegelin’s
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mind was precisely the kind of anxious monad he described as
quintessentially Lutheran and German. While Parsons succumbed
for a time to the systematic thinker’s great temptation – to pursue
theoretical architectonics for their own sake – he was ever the
outward- and forward-looking American. Voegelin, by contrast,
was the tradition-saddled European, gazing alternatingly backwards
and inwards.
Evidently, the two had different parts to play. But each thinker
resolutely faced the same political and social-scientific challenges in
a way that would make the most of each man’s training and tradition.
Their correspondence offers all the more reason to think that for both
remarkable scholars this meant an increasingly self-aware approach to
the business of scholarship from intellectual traditions fundamentally
shaped by different ways of experiencing, understanding, and sym-
bolizing transcendence.
This essay has endeavored to harvest some of the intellectual fruit
of the correspondence between two thinkers who have played a major
role in shaping contemporary discourse about the nature and prob-
lems of modern society and politics. By publishing them online, The
European Journal of Sociology has granted readers the world over
ready access to the letters. The entire correspondence – along with
editorial notes on the letters’ publication history, current location and
condition, and people and books to which they refer – is available
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003975613000192. By being made
widely available, the letters are sure to once again illuminate ongoing
conversations about the legacies of the great world religions and the tasks
of the social sciences alike.
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Resume
De 1940 a 1944, Talcott Parsons et Eric
Voegelin, opposant au nazisme recemment
emigre entretiennent une correspondance
suivie que I’on peut classer sous cinq grandes
entrees : Theorie de I’action et histoire des
idees politiques, Formes de secularisation,
Methodologie des sciences sociales, Legs de
Max Weber, La transcendance des sciences
sociales. Certaines lettres on deja ete pub-
liees, mais I’ensemble ne I’avait pas ete. II
I’est desormais dans I’edition electronique
de la revue. L’article ici propose entend e^tre
une presentation et un guide pour eviter le
piege d’anachronisme dans I’interpretation.
Mots cles: Parsons ; Voegelin ; Religion ;
Theorie de I’action ; Antisemitisme ; Tran-
scendance ; Periode axiale.
Zusammenfassung
Von 1940 bis 1944 f€uhren Talcott Parsons und
Eric Voegelin, ein k€urzlich ausgewanderter
Naziregimegegner, einen Briefwechsel, der in
f€unf große Abschnitte unterteilt werden kann:
Handlungstheorie und politische Ideenge-
schichte, S€akularisationsformen, sozialwissen-
schaftliche Methodik, Webers Verm€achtnis,
Transzendenz der Sozialwissenschaften.
Auch wenn einige Briefe bereits ver€offentlicht
worden sind, gab es bis dato keine Gesamtaus-
gabe. Sie liegt nun als elektronische Ausgabe
der Zeitschrift vor. Der hier ver€offentlichte
Beitrag versteht sich als Einf€uhrung und Leit-
faden, um eine Irref€uhrung der Interpretation
durch den Anachronismus zu verhindern.
Schlagw€orter: Parsons; Voegelin; Religion;
Handlungstheorie; Antisemitismus; Trans-
zendenz; Axial Age.
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